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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to understand the core components of the Afghan 
Taliban information strategy, which they treat as their main effort in their struggle to 
regain power.  The Taliban use cultural metaphors from multiple sources such as Islam, 
pushtunwali, and Afghanistan’s history to frame their right of religious and political 
authority.  Taliban information strategy interweaves these metaphors with threats to sow 
fear in the minds of the Afghan population. Such methods employed by the Taliban to 
send their messages consist of leaving shabnamehs (night letters) to demonstrate that the 
Taliban can appear at anytime.  More modern methods such as creating DVDs have 
recently been incorporated into their toolbox for the purpose of sustaining their fighter’s 
moral and recruiting new followers inspired by their battle victories.  This thesis 
determines that the Taliban are focusing their information strategy on short-term goals 
and thus, is relatively ineffective.  This is derived from polling data that demonstrates the 
majority of Afghan people do not support the Taliban or desire to see their return to 
power.  The Taliban are viewed as the reason for poor security despite their efforts to 
convince the population that the government cannot provide security.  The Taliban 
information strategy has relied primarily on fear and coercion rather than persuasion.  
The Taliban’s problematic IO strategy affords multiple opportunities for the United 
States and its allies to reach out to those parts of the Afghan population for whom the 
Taliban provide a disproportionate amount of all their information.  This thesis makes 
specific recommendations on how best to achieve this goal. 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the U.S. military and its 
coalition partners have defeated Taliban forces when openly confronted by them.  While 
no one seems to suggest that the Taliban will defeat the U.S militarily, there have been 
concerns in recent years about how they are defeating U.S. forces on the information 
battlefield.  The Taliban have not capitulated or faded away, despite eight years of war.  
They retain a level of support that allows them to continue operations in Afghanistan.  
The Taliban also operate freely in the border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan.   
The support the Taliban grows and maintains comes through its information 
strategy.  U.S. forces cannot be everywhere in the region and, because of this, the 
population does not have direct knowledge of America’s goals and activities.  Coupled 
with the lack of information and transportation infrastructure, the people have very few 
outlets to gain accurate information.  This is an advantage for the Taliban because they 
can fill the vacuum of information with their own views.  As more U.S. forces build up in 
Afghanistan and the Pakistani military begins to confront Taliban forces in the border 
region, how will the Taliban maintain their support? 
Addressing this issue will be difficult because the situation is constantly evolving 
and little literature is current on the subject.  This thesis gathers information from open 
sources, information gleaned from recent articles, studies and reports.  From this 
research, I will attempt to offer future trends the Taliban may follow and offer 
suggestions on how U.S. forces can defeat the Taliban information strategy. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The United States (U.S.) toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in a quick 
manner after the launching of Operation Enduring Freedom.  Although the Taliban 
governed most of the country, this defeat was possible because they did not have the full 
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support of the population.  Those opposed to the Taliban, including elements of the 
ancient regime, assisted U.S. forces in overthrowing Taliban rule.  Eight years onward 
the United States is still fighting in Afghanistan and facing a resurgent Taliban presence.  
How could, after such a sweeping victory by the U.S., the Taliban still be a threat after all 
these years?  The answers lies not in the military prowess or ability of the Taliban to 
remain a viable threat, but rather a combination of the Taliban executing an adequate 
information strategy and the United States executing a poor one. 
The United State’s poor information strategy is no secret, nor does it go 
unrecognized.  Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said during a speech at Kansas State 
University  
Public relations was invented in the United States, yet we are miserable at 
communicating to the rest of the world what we are about as a society and 
a culture, about freedom and democracy, about our policies and our goals. 
It is just plain embarrassing that al-Qaeda is better at communicating its 
message on the Internet than America…Speed, agility, and cultural 
relevance are not terms that come readily to mind when discussing U.S. 
strategic communications.1    
The purpose of the quote is not to confuse the reader by assuming al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban are the same, but to show that there is an understanding at the highest levels 
of the government that America is not conducting an effective information strategy.  
While the Taliban and al-Qaeda are different entities, the Taliban has learned a few 
things from al-Qaeda about conducting an information campaign.   
C. PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHOD 
1. Purpose 
The Taliban assumed power in Afghanistan soon after the withdrawal of Soviet 
forces until they were removed from power during Operation Enduring Freedom.  The 
Afghan population is aware of the way the Taliban ruled before they were toppled.  As 
                                                 
1 Robert Gates, Landon Lecture (Kansas State University), 
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199 (accessed June 16, 2009).  
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the Taliban enjoyed a certain degree of sanctuary in Pakistan and regrouped, what have 
they done as a group to change the population’s opinion about the Taliban?   
The purpose of this study is to examine the Taliban Information Strategy, how 
have they directed their information campaign towards the population in Afghanistan and 
how are they currently directing their information campaign towards the population of 
Pakistan.  This research is aimed at benefiting information strategists dealing with the 
Taliban in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region and how they may develop countermeasures 
for mitigating Taliban influence and support.  This thesis will also be beneficial for 
operations planners to develop a better understanding of what types of actions planned 
could play into the hands of Taliban messaging themes that may lead to greater support 
for Taliban causes or at the least neutral attitudes towards U.S./Coalition forces. 
This study shows that the Taliban have evolved since their formation from a 
movement that shunned modern technologies to one that has begun using technological 
assets to disseminate their message.  This study does not try to determine whether the 
Taliban ideology has changed or evolved, but it does show that the Taliban have adopted 
the use of previous information tools that were previously rejected.    
The Taliban are using similar themes in their efforts to return to power today as 
they used when they first rose to power in Afghanistan, such as the government is 
corrupt, the government should be based on Islamic law, and the government cannot 
provide security to the people.  The difference in their recent efforts is that the people of 
Afghanistan know what life under Taliban rule was like and Taliban must now convince 
the people that they have learned from their past and now offer a better alternative.   
Despite decreasing support for U.S. efforts and the Afghan government, the 
Taliban have not been able to capture any significant amount of support that would bring 
them back into power.  The Taliban information strategy may be increasing the 
population’s level of discontent, but it does not appear to be achieving an increase in the 
populations support for their efforts. 
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2. Scope 
The scope of this thesis considers the overall Taliban information strategy.  This 
is not meant to examine specific themes in one area alone, but to determine what the 
overall theme of the Taliban information strategy is and where there are seams in that 
strategy that can be exploited.   
I will look at whether their words match their deeds, if there is a coordinated 
strategy across different ethnic populations in Afghanistan, how they justify their actions 
culturally and religiously, and how if they have altered their view on certain issues prior 
to their being toppled and their current resurgence such as their views on the use of 
technology and education.   
3. Method 
The methodology for effectively gauging the Taliban information strategy is slim.  
The best data to use is polling data.  Fortunately, more polling data has been obtained 
over the past few years from a variety of sources.  Unfortunately, this data is only a few 
years old and is difficult to establish a correlation between Taliban words and deeds with 
their effect over a long period of time.   
Besides polling data there is a growing body of work written about the Taliban’s 
activities that will provide insight into establishing their overall objectives and 
informational themes that may contribute to reaching their objectives.  Through these 
bodies of work, I will determine if there is an existence of a long-term information 
strategy being employed by the Taliban to achieve its objectives or if they merely focus 
on short-term gains.   
Determining casual effects between the Taliban’s messages and the growing 
discontent with the Afghan government and U.S./Coalition forces will be paramount to 
establishing whether the Taliban have a long term or short term information strategy.  If 
the Taliban concentrate their messages on highlighting the failures of the Afghan 
government or the death toll Coalition forces take on the civilian population, than the 
Taliban would seem to embrace a short-term strategy that can be overcome by changes in 
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governance and tactics.  If, however, the Taliban have a longer term strategy at play they 
should be trying to influence Afghanis that they have solutions to their problems and are 
finding ways to connect with the population to garner support.   
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The thesis is organized into four chapters.  The first chapter is the Introduction, 
which identifies the purpose of the thesis.  Following the Introduction is the Background, 
which discusses who the Taliban are, how they came to power and how they ruled when 
they were in power.  The first chapter ends with the explanation of the purpose, scope and 
method of the thesis. 
Chapter II discusses the Taliban Information Strategy.  When the Taliban ruled 
Afghanistan, they banned the use of modern day technologies such as computers and cell 
phones.  Their recent information activities have been conducted using the tools they 
once forbid.  Video footage is recorded for the purpose of backing up their claims and for 
recruiting.  This footage is distributed on DVDs, as well as posted on the Internet.  The 
non-technological means of sowing fear in an area through the use of night letters, which 
are threatening notes posted or graffiti scrolled onto doors or walls, has evolved to text 
messaging key individuals to sow fear. The recent acceptance of these technologies has 
led to their messages appearing uncoordinated because of the leadership’s uneven 
understanding of the reach these technologies can achieve.  
Chapter III will look into the effects of the Taliban information strategy through 
the examination of polling data.  The effects considered are whether the Taliban’s 
messages are resonating with the population and resulting in garnering overt support for 
their aims.  The data cited will show that over the last few years there has been a decrease 
in the Afghan population’s positive view of the U.S. forces and of the central government 
and their abilities to provide security and increase their well-being.  The polling data does 
not indicate a reciprocal increase in support for the Taliban efforts or for their return to 
power.     
Finally, Chapter IV will offers the conclusion that the Taliban information 
strategy is concerned with the short term objective of demonstrating that they will always 
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be present in the area but U.S. forces are a temporary fixture.  The Taliban must only 
demonstrate to the people that the U.S. forces are an occupying presence and that they 
will one day leave Afghanistan.  This information strategy demonstrate that the Taliban 
do not appear to plan for a return to power by informing the population what their future 
rule will be able to provide to the people.  The lack of solid support for their efforts by 
the people indicates that the people do not think the Taliban are the future rulers but they 
do not want to make them enemies that will exact revenge on those who opposed them. 
The U.S. needs to confront the Taliban information strategy directly by challenging all 
false claims by the Taliban and exposing any Taliban hypocrisy at every opportunity.  .  
These recommendations should provide a point of departure for further discussions and 
ideas to counter the Taliban information strategy.   
 
 7
II. TALIBAN INFORMATION STRATEGY 
Both the Taliban and the United States started at a disadvantage for effectively 
conducting information strategies.  The Taliban were known for their rejection of modern 
devices and un-Islamic practices such as television, music and the internet.  This rejection 
put them at an immediate disadvantage in trying to spread their messages to mass 
audiences.  On the other hand, the United States embraced modern devices but failed to 
understand why the Taliban were able to rise to power in the first place.  After the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, lawlessness and rampant corruption abounded.  When the 
Taliban took over an area they ruthlessly brought law and order, and stamped out the 
corruption of local officials.  Eventually, there was an up swell in support of the Taliban.  
The support for the Taliban occurred for two reasons; a) the Taliban brought law and 
order and thus peace to the areas they controlled and b) there was a Pashtun ethnic 
identification associated with the Taliban in the southern and eastern regions.  These 
factors did not, however, equate to a deep-seated sense of legitimacy, which is why, when 
the United States invaded, the people switched their allegiances quickly, hoping for an 
alternative system.   
This chapter discusses the Taliban information strategy.  The first part of this 
chapter covers how the Taliban frame the issues of their religious authority, how they 
justify Pashtun authority in non-majority Pashtun areas, how they justify opium 
production.  The second part of the chapter will discuss the means they use to spread their 
messages and lastly if they coordinate their messages.  
The Taliban information strategy focuses on the key themes of establishing Sharia 
law (Islamic law), government corruption and establishing peace.  These themes are in 
areas that the Taliban say the current government in Afghanistan is failing.  These themes 
are spread through messaging that utilizes various tools such as night letters, DVDs with 
video of recent Taliban “battle victories” and an established Web presence.  The result of 
the expansion of available tools the Taliban are using to disseminate their messages, an 
unintended consequence has emerged.  There is a lack of coordination between those 
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conveying the message and those elements conducting their activities.  As a result, the 
Taliban at times appear to contradict themselves.  Such a failure to synchronize their 
efforts should decrease their ability to build greater support for their return to power.   
A. UNDERSTANDING CULTURAL FRAMING IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
THEORY 
In understanding how the Taliban’s information strategy works, it is helpful to 
explore social movement theory to better understand the Taliban.  Social movement 
theory (SMT) seeks to explain how a social movement takes root in a society and rises 
within that society.  Social movement theory is based on three variables within its 
context.  The first variable seeks to analyze how changes in political opportunity 
structures impact the acceleration or deceleration of collective action.  The second SMT 
variable focuses on mobilizing structures for the group in question.  The third variable is 
"cultural framing." 
Unlike the other two analytical approaches, SMT takes cultural issues seriously, 
but more in an ideological-tactical sense than is typically found in primordial 
understandings of culture.  In SMT, culture is conceptualized as multi-tiered.  Every 
society has a variety of stories, symbols, and histories that make up something of a 
collective cultural toolbox.2     
After the Afghans, with support from the United States, defeated the Soviet 
Union, there was much enthusiasm for the future.  The Mujahedeen were viewed as 
heroes and very popular.  Soon after the Soviet withdrawal, key leaders of the 
mujahedeen began fighting for power in the aftermath.  These leaders retained the 
militias they lead against the Soviets and used them to gain power.  The militias were 
often manned from the tribes of their leaders.  This resulted in civil war with tribes 
fighting against other tribes within Afghanistan.  Soon the new government in 
Afghanistan became corrupt as the militia commanders or warlords were given positions 
within the government as methods to share power.  The warlords would reward their 
                                                 
2 Glenn Robinson, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, date), 116. 
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tribes with positions based on tribal membership and not merit.  The tribal fighting and 
corruption lead to disillusionment among the people and the high regard they had for the 
mujahedeen. 
These circumstances lead to the factors that formed the basis of the Taliban’s 
cultural framing of the situation, resulting in a social movement as described by 
McAdams and Tilly.  “Mediating between opportunity, organization and action are the 
shared meanings that people bring to their situations. At a minimum, they need to feel 
both aggrieved about some aspect of their lives and optimistic that, by acting collectively, 
they can redress the problem. Lacking either one or both of these perceptions, it is 
unlikely that they will mobilize even when afforded the opportunity to do so.”3  The 
following explanation by a Taliban spokesman about why the Taliban were able to rise to 
power, demonstrates McAdams and Tilly’s point that by taking advantage of the peoples 
feeling of aggravation about their situation created a sense of optimism that the Taliban 
would be able to right the wrongs they saw occurring in Afghanistan. 
A Taliban spokesman, Mullah Wakil Ahmed, gave an interview in 1996 on why 
and how the Taliban formed.   
After the Mujahidin parties came to power in 1992, the Afghan people 
thought that peace would prevail in the country.  However, the leaders 
began to fight over power in Kabul.  Some local leaders, particularly in 
Kandahar, formed armed gangs that fought each other.  There was 
widespread corruption and theft, and there were roadblocks everywhere.  
Women were being attacked, raped, and killed.  Therefore, after these 
incidents, a group of students from religious schools decided to rise 
against these leaders in order to alleviate the suffering of the residents of 
Kandahar Province.  We were able to take control of several centers until 
we reached Kandahar and the former leaders fled from there.4   
The Taliban gained acceptance and a following through their shrewd ‘framing’ of 
issues through a combination of Islamic, Afghan and Pushtun symbols. The Taliban have 
                                                 
3 Doug McAdam,; Sidney Tarrow,; and Charles Tilly, , "Towards An Integrated Perspective on Social 
Movements and Revolution," Columbia International Affairs Online (1996): 13, 
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/tic04/index.html (accessed December 2, 2009). 
4 Peter Mardsen, The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan (Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 60–61. 
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used the common religion of Islam in Afghanistan as a tie of commonality to bind the 
Pashtuns together to rise to power.  The Taliban used a common theme within the 
Muslim world, which is “Islam is the solution,”5  to recruit members.  The Taliban 
portrayed themselves as the ones who are truly trying to establish an Afghan government  
based on Islamic law sharia, while the government that was established after the Soviets 
left consisted only of members trying to make a power grab and had no interest in 
establishing an Islamic state.   
The education which the Taliban were receiving in the madaris [religious schools] 
from semi-educated maulvis [religious teachers], however, converted them into religious 
fanatics.  They were made to believe that none of the then Afghan leaders was sincere 
about the establishment of what they perceived to be a truly Islamic state in Afghanistan.  
They were told that the struggle between Rabbani and Hikmetyar—two key leaders from 
the Soviet Afghan War—and the others was more about grabbing power than an effort to 
introduce Islamic practices in accordance with their own interpretations of Islam.  The 
blame for the pitiable conditions in which the Afghans found themselves was placed at 
the doorsteps of the existing mujahedeen factions.6     
The education the Taliban received was part of a cultural framing process that 
instilled in them a belief in their cause. “Movements and counter-movements not only are 
involved in mobilization contests to demonstrate who has the most support and resources 
at their command, they are involved in framing contests attempting to persuade 
authorities and by-standers of the rightness of their cause.”7  An understanding of who 
the Taliban are influenced people to view the Taliban as a group that would not partake in 
the actions that were affecting the rest of the country i.e. corruption, political power 
struggles and a government not guided my Islamic teachings.  The importance of this 
                                                 
5 Robinson, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, 116. 
6 Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994–1997 (Karachi: Oxford University 
Press, 1999),  24–25. 
7 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press,  1996), 269. 
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facet of SMT is that it leads the people to perceive the Taliban as a group that would 
bring much needed peace and order to a country tired of war.   
The Taliban were able to condense their ideology down to a few simple messages; 
establish an Islamic state in Afghanistan based on Sharia law, end corruption and 
lawlessness, peace will be established where the Taliban rule.  This would all be possible 
because Islam is the solution.  This easy to understand ideology has enabled the Taliban, 
as a social movement, to effectively use cultural framing to gain power.   This framing 
would fit Glenn Robinson’s idea that “to effectively popularize its ideology, a social 
movement must be able to provide clear summations of its ideology that resonate with its 
target audience.  Such cultural framings represent the popular, bumper-sticker version of 
the broader ideology of the movement.”8   The ideology of the Taliban resonated among 
the people because the people where the Taliban originated were of the same ethnic 
group, Pashtun, and they were sick of the corruption and fighting that had been occurring 
for over a decade at that point.   
B. TALIBAN IDEOLOGY 
The Taliban ideology is discussed in the following sections.  The first part 
discusses how the Taliban ruled by sharia law, and why they are the ones to rightfully 
enforce sharia law.  Next, the Taliban talk about the corruption that currently exists in 
Afghanistan.  Finally, the last part discusses the Taliban bringing peace to the areas its 
rules and how they see that peace being achieved through areas of different ethnicities, 
where opium is being grown and their thoughts on education. 
1. Establish Sharia 
The Taliban’s belief that Afghanistan should be governed by sharia is based on 
their origins.  They were students in extremist madrasa’s “being prepared for jihad 
against those who it felt, were not adhering to the moral code of Islam.”9   Thus, with the 
fighting and corruption they witnessed in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, they 
                                                 
8 Robinson, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, 129. 
9 Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994–1997, 22. 
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saw only one way for the people to be ruled.  That way was through the establishment of 
an Islamic State ruled by their interpretation of sharia law.   
As the Taliban started to rise under the leadership of Mullah Omar, they realized 
that in order to continue on their path they needed to be viewed with a sense of 
legitimacy.  Since Afghanistan was a Muslim country, the Taliban needed to be seen as 
the group that would be able to establish Islamic rule.  During the mid-1990s in 
Afghanistan, many groups wanted to find ways to negotiate peace among the different 
elements within Afghanistan.  The Taliban however were not looking for peace because 
all they saw was corruption.  In Kandahar, a gathering of over 1,000 religious leaders 
from the Pashtun areas took place in the spring of 1996.  The mullahs discussed a way 
forward but agreement could not be reached.   The Taliban used a bold move to establish 
themselves as a legitimate authority.  Ahmad Rashid explains: 
To patch over their differences, the core group of Kandaharis around 
Mullah Omar nominated him to become the “Amir-ul Momineen” or 
“Commander of the Faithful,” an Islamic title that made him the 
undisputed leader of the jihad and the Emir of Afghanistan.  (The Taliban 
were later to rename the country the Emirate of Afghanistan).  On 4 April 
1996, Omar appeared on the roof of a building in the centre of the city, 
wrapped in the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammed, which had been taken 
out of its shrine for the first time in 60 years.  As Omar wrapped and 
unwrapped the Cloak around his body and allowed it to flap in the wind, 
he was rapturously applauded by the assembled throng of mullahs in the 
courtyard below, as they shouted “Amir-ul Momineen.” 
This oath of allegiance or “baiat” was a procedure similar to when Caliph 
Omar was confirmed as leader of the Muslim community in Arabia after 
the death of the Prophet Mohammed.  It was a political masterstroke, for 
by cloaking himself with the Prophet’s mantle, Mullah Omar had assumed 
the right to lead not just all Afghans, but all Muslims.10  
The Taliban professed they were enforcing sharia law, but in reality they were 
enforcing a social code called Pashtunwali.  Pashtunwali gives “the tribal jirga or council 
the right to make judgments on cases from a traditional pantheon of laws and 
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punishments, especially when it came to disputes over ownership of land and women and 
murder.  The line between Pashtunwali and Sharia law has always been blurred for the 
Pashtuns.  Taliban punishments were in fact drawn largely from Pashtunwali rather than 
Sharia.”11  
2. Corruption 
The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan left a country decimated by 
a decade’s worth of war.  The mujahedeen commanders who fought the war gained 
power during the war by creating their own militias.  After the war, they held onto these 
private militias to help ensure they remained powerful.  They used these militias to 
ensure they had positions of importance within the new government and then doled out 
jobs to those who remained loyal to them.  This led to rampant corruption within the new 
government of Afghanistan.   
The level of corruption was a major contributor of discontent among the 
population.  This was a key issue that the Taliban were able to seize upon for justification 
on the need to follow sharia.  The Taliban vowed to stamp out corruption when they first 
came to power.   Corruption, for the Taliban went beyond government officials awarding 
jobs based on loyalty to different factions rather than merit, or business being conducted 
through bribery.  For the Taliban, fighting corruption included fighting off the corrupt 
influences, which were explained as those activities that were un-Islamic or western 
influenced.  Mullah Omar has stated in the past “that his main goal was to rid 
Afghanistan of ‘corrupt Western-oriented time-servers.’12   In Mullah Omar’s view 
western influences of corruption in Afghanistan need to be stopped.  The Taliban have 
taken actions to stop this corruption in instance such as denying women the right to work.  
These views have their origins in past attempts by Afghan rulers to reform the country.  
Daoud Khan was the Afghan Prime Minister from 1953-1963 and President from 1973-
1978.  During his time in power he enacted reform policies that were meant to improve 
the rights of women, such as the right to work and the right to appear in public without a 
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veil.  In 1978, Daoud was overthrown in a coup by the People’s Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA).  The PDPA enacted reforms that included seeing females received 
an education in order to stop the high levels of illiteracy in Afghanistan.  These reforms 
were met with resistance by tribal leaders form the rural areas.  Both the governments of 
Daoud and the PDPA had many western educated members and were looked upon with 
suspicion by rural inhabitants.   
During their reign in power the Taliban were attempting to turn the clock back in 
Afghanistan to a time before western influenced government officials were wielding 
power.  “Thus, in prohibiting women from working, the Taliban consider that they are 
freeing society of what they see as the corrupt influences that have crept in as a 
consequence of Daoud’s reforms, the PDPA coup and the fourteen years of Soviet-
backed governments, the period of rule by the Islamist parties and the presence of 
Western agencies.”13   Their view of corruption also extends to girls education.  “There is 
concern that girls will be corrupted by anything other than a pure Islamic teaching, 
consistent with the Taliban interpretation of Islam, and a consequent wish to create an 
exclusive focus on what is seen as their important role of bringing up the next generation 
of pure Muslims.”14   Other activities that the Taliban consider un-Islamic and corrupting 
are well documented such as kite flying, listening to music and other activities that take 
away from worshiping God.   
The Taliban were successful in reducing their ideas of corruption in the areas they 
controlled, however the Taliban were not opposed to engaging in corruption to seize 
power themselves.  The Taliban used bribery as an effective means to quickly gain 
control of areas by buying the allegiance of government officials and military 
commanders.15    
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The Taliban, despite being ousted from power, still make use of the corruption 
theme based on the personnel holding positions of power within the Karzai government.  
In an article in The Australian from 2003 an Afghan official close to the presidency in 
referring to the warlords is quoted as saying “The same criminals, thieves and racketeers 
whose chaos led the Taliban to emerge in the first place are back in control, and their 
inefficiency and corruption are giving birth to the rise of the Taliban again. They are the 
germs of decadence in our society."16  The patronage that the warlords bestow amongst 
those loyal to them leads to the perception that not only is the central government 
considered corrupt, so are members of provincial government as well as the Afghan 
National Police.  This is supported in a research document that states that   
Far reaching research by human rights organizations demonstrates that 
Afghans in general believe that warlords accused of war crimes have 
weakened the authority of the state by hijacking critical positions of power 
in various public institutions around the country.  Therefore, the public 
finds it difficult to rely on the state to provide them with protection, 
improve their living conditions, and defend their rights to life, liberty, and 
justice.17  
These views, shared among the population, make the Taliban’s accusations 
against the Afghan government a theme that can easily resonate and endear the Taliban to 
the people.  The Taliban were perceived as having been successful in reducing corruption 
where they ruled.   
3. Peace Where the Taliban Rule 
The Taliban ruthlessly brought peace to the areas they took control over.  The 
peace they brought came with a price.  This section will look at how the Taliban dealt 
with other ethnicities in Afghanistan during the period when warlords and tribes were  
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fighting one another.  Another area addressed is how the Taliban effectively cut back 
opium production in the later period of their rule and how they now view opium 
production and keep the peace in areas where they operate.    
a. Ethnicity 
The Taliban originated in Pashtun regions of the south and east of 
Afghanistan bordering along Pakistan.  The result is that the Taliban are predominantly 
Pashtun.  They do however have members from other ethnicities.  The Taliban realized 
that to try and control all of Afghanistan they must incorporate members of other ethnic 
groups.  “During their negotiations with representatives of Ahmed Shah Masood and 
Abdul Rashid Dostum, the Taliban were represented by Uzbeks and Tajiks—just to prove 
the point that the Taliban did not comprise Pashtuns alone.”18  
The Taliban may have included other ethnicities, but they did not entrust 
those groups with any sense of power.  “In Kabul and Herat and later Mazar—none of 
which have a Pashtun majority—the Taliban’s representatives such as governor, mayor, 
police chiefs and other senior administrators are invariably Kandahari Pashtuns who 
either do not speak Dari, the lingua franca of these cities or speak it poorly.  There is no 
prominent local citizen in any of these local Shuras.”19  Through these actions, the 
Taliban demonstrated that their appointed representatives had a greater desire to impose 
the Taliban brand of Islam on the local populace instead of ruling according to the 
traditions of that region.  The Taliban would impose harsh treatments on urban areas 
where the populations were mixed with the different ethnicities.  The Taliban “viewed the 
northerners as impure Muslims who had to be forcibly re-Islamicized.”20   The Taliban 
carrying out their form of sharia law based on Pashtunwali, was perceived by non-
Pashtuns as their way of imposing their Pashtun laws on the entire country.  This resulted 
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in further ethnic divides between the groups.21   Despite this divide among the ethnicities, 
the Taliban’s harsh methods enabled them to keep the peace in non-Pashtun areas. 
b. Opium Production 
Opium production has been a lucrative cash crop for Afghanistan.  When 
Mullah Omar and the Taliban came to power, however, he banned the cultivation of 
poppies.  Mullah Omar’s basis for this ban was based in religious teaching.   
Since the Taliban’s removal from power, their words have changed little 
but their actions have changed to one of support in order to generate income.  The 
Taliban in the past have claimed that corrupt government officials have been responsible 
for the cultivation of poppies, a theme they continue with today.  In a November 2006 
interview conducted by the on-line Taliban magazine called Al-Sumud, Abdel Rahim, the 
commander of Helmand province at the time was asked: 
[Correspondent] Westerners claim that the Taliban movement plays a role 
in the narcotics trade and that it uses the revenue from this trade to finance 
its military operations. What is your answer to these claims? 
[Abdelrahim] The Taliban movement has honorable objectives and, for the 
sake of its religion, never stoops to lowly acts. It also uses honorable 
methods in pursuing its goals. The world bears witness that the Taliban 
government was the first ever authority to destroy the cultivation of 
narcotic drugs and the drug trade in the whole of Afghanistan. This was an 
achievement that astounded the world. International drug lords began to 
think of ways to help global intelligence services to topple the Taliban 
government to defend their financial interests that were linked to the drug 
trade. After the puppet government was established in Afghanistan, senior 
government figures were seen to be involved in the narcotics trade, chiefly 
Ahmad Wali Karzai, brother of the agent [now-president Hamid] Karzai, 
and his partner the famous smuggler Hajj Adam from Helmand's Nawa-i-
Barakzayi district.  When the puppet government's Interior Minister Ali 
Ahmad Jalali examined the file of the drug merchants, he found that senior 
government figures were among them. He reported their names to the 
United Nations and the U.S. Government but he could not do anything to 
them because they are under strong U.S. protection and the Americans  
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need them to run this government. The interior minister was forced to 
resign his post. Their accusation that we are involved in the drug trade is 
similar to their other false accusations.22  
The Taliban use these government corruption themes to highlight the 
failure of the U.S.-backed Karzai regime, and talk of how they were the ones who ended 
this un-Islamic activity.  The majority of poppies are grown in the Pashtun regions of 
southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban maintain a strong presence.  “In 2006, the 
southern province of Helmand accounted for 46% of Afghanistan’s opium production. To 
the east of Helmand, Kandahar produced eight percent. In other words, the majority of 
Afghanistan’s opium economy is built on production in two southern provinces.”23   
Because poppies bring in so much money the Taliban turns a blind eye to the farmers 
cultivating the crops, in return the Taliban maintain peace in their regions because the 
farmers have jobs, and the Taliban can demand a payment for providing the security for 
government efforts to stop them from growing poppy.   
The amount of dependence the Taliban rely on poppies is explained in a 
2007 report by The Jamestown Foundation.  
Law enforcement officers and UNODC officials interviewed by the 
authors in April 2007 believe that the “Taliban are completely dependent 
on the narco-economy for their financing.” Where the Taliban are able to 
enforce it—mostly in the south and some eastern districts—they are said 
to levy a 40% tax on opium cultivation and trafficking. A low estimate of 
the amount that the Taliban earn from the opium economy is $10 million, 
but considering the tradition of imposing tithes on cultivation and 
activities further up the value chain, the total is likely to be at least $20 
million.24  
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Despite these figures, the Taliban continue to deny their involvement in 
poppy production.  In a 2007 interview in Al-Sumud, the Taliban Deputy Leader, Mullah 
Bradar, stated: 
[Correspondent] You have referred to the issue of capabilities and the 
agent administration of Karzai, while some international observers claim 
that the only way to fund the mujahidin of the Islamic Emirate is through 
drug cultivation and dealing, and that the mujahidin depends on drugs to 
confront the Crusader forces.  In addition, the administration claims that 
the areas under your control have the greatest amount cannabis under 
cultivation. 
 [Bradar] First, let me say that the Mujahidin of the Islamic Emirate are 
legal mujahidin.  They are not mercenaries or fighters without creed.  
Their resistance against the aggressor occupiers is a religious resistance 
based on the rulings of the Koran and the Sunnah.  Undoubtedly, the 
sound creed and the sacred jihad are the greatest aims that need legal 
[funding] means.  The cultivation of drugs and earning money through it is 
prohibited, and it cannot be used as a justification for achieving a legal 
aim.  Therefore, I can assure you that financing the legal jihad operations 
through illegal means is considered high treason to the religious jihad.  
The mujahidin is ordained to follow legal means for its jihad in 
accordance with the Koranic and prophetic texts that call for this matter 
and forbid prohibited means. 
Second, during its rule, the Islamic Emirate issued a resolution 
unprecedented in Afghanistan's history when it forbade drug trafficking 
and cultivation.  The Crusaders and their allies are aware of this. 
If the agent administration of Karzai criticizes and condemns the 
mujahidin of the Islamic Emirate on these false charges, why does it not 
question itself?  Why does it not ask about the position of Karzai's brother, 
Wali Karzai?  All the people know that he is a drug dealer inside Karzai's 
office in Kabul.25  
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The Taliban’s willingness to overlook the “high treason” of the poppy 
farmers has led to a current peace between the Taliban and farmers, but this is unlikely to 
last if the Karzai government and Coalition forces establish a greater presence in the 
poppy growing regions where the Taliban are active.   
C. SPREADING THE WORD 
1. Night Letters 
Afghanistan is a country lacking the infrastructure that is common in a modern 
nation. Few good roads exist for cross-country transportation routes.  This limits the 
possibility of accurate news being reported throughout Afghanistan.  Coupled with the 
lack of transportation routes is a lack of communications infrastructure that would allow 
access to information systems in order to receive accurate information.  This situation is 
an advantage for the Taliban to disseminate its messages.  With so few outlets to access 
accurate information, Afghanis gather their information through word of mouth.  This 
benefits the Taliban because the people have no timely way to check the accuracy of 
what it is they are hearing.  The other advantage for the Taliban is that they easily 
penetrate this system of information flow with their own uncontested versions of their 
message. 
One of the most effective ways the Taliban are able to disseminate their 
uncontested message is through the use of what are called “night letters.”  “Night letters 
are leaflets or letters posted to doors or walls to inform, threaten or advise.  They are an 
effective means of communication in areas where access to other media is limited. The 
contents of the night letters are usually warnings or instructions to the local population—
to refrain from engagement with foreigners or to avoid sending children to schools, for 
example.”26   A night letter directed towards the people in Khost from May 2008 
demonstrates the type of rhetoric the Taliban use in their messaging.  
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In the name of the “Afghanistan Islamic Emirate Khost Jihadi Military Front” 
warned “all residents in Khost” that: 
1. Tribal elders should not consider the U.S. stronger than God and 
not give verdicts against mujahidin; otherwise you will soon regret it. 
2. Those who spy and work for the infidel government and military 
forces should quit their jobs by 20 June; otherwise they will see something 
which they have never seen in their lives. 
3. Do not get close to the infidel forces at any time or in any place. 
4. During attacks on government and infidel forces, you should keep 
yourselves safe and not provide support for them; if this rule is violated, 
your death will be the same as the death of the U.S. and their puppets. 
5. Our mines are live; we do not allow the killing of civilians, but you 
should not show them to the infidels and their slaves. We will show our 
power to those who show our land mines to them or inform them about us. 
6. When you see infidel forces on the street and roads, stop where 
you are and do not go forward.  
7. Those mullahs who perform funerals for those who are killed in 
the campaign—national army, national and border police and 
intelligence—will be killed with torture; and remember: such a mullah 
will never be forgiven.27  
The use of night letters is particularly effective because the Taliban can move in 
and out of villages and towns unnoticed compared to how U.S. forces move in and out of 
towns.  Whereas the U.S. forces want to be seen and purposely convey information, the 
Taliban may not want to be seen in order to propagate fear into the local population by 
demonstrating through night letters they can be around at anytime. 
There are instances where the night letters effectiveness is apparent, as a Time 
magazine article would indicate.  “Night letters left across southern Afghanistan, the 
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Taliban's stronghold, have slowed government services and brought reconstruction 
projects to a halt. In Kandahar province, many police officers have quit, and after letters 
appeared threatening employees, two medical clinics were shut down. In the past two 
months, insurgents have burned down 11 schools in the region. Some of the attacks were 
presaged by night letters warning parents to keep their children home.”28   Instances like 
this demonstrate the ability of the Taliban to spread fear.  The night letters themselves are 
not the most influential part of a Taliban information strategy; it is their ability to carry 
out what it is they threaten to carry out.  American and Afghan forces cannot be 
everywhere at once.  Since U.S. and Afghan forces wear uniforms and are visible, it is 
easy to tell when they are present.  Their presence reassures the populace of their safety.  
The Taliban however, can move wherever there are no government forces present and 
spread their fear.   
The Taliban effectively communicate to the people that they will be the ones who 
will remain when the U.S. forces withdraw.  One night letter that showcases this is 
presented in an article by Thomas Johnson, which when translated offered a warning to 
the people of Khandahar “that the Taliban will kill all those who cooperate with the 
Americans once the Americans leave.  The point is emphasized by asserting that ‘the 
Americans will not always be there’ to protect those who chose to cooperate.  Moreover, 
the letter states that the Taliban ‘knows’ the names and location of collaborators and 
compares these present-day collaborators with those who were ‘loyal’ to the Russians 
during the anti-Soviet jihad.”29  This is a difficult strategy to counter.  This strategy is 
suited to the Taliban because they do not travel in units or as parts of a convoy or with 
force protection measures in place.  To sow fear only requires one member of the Taliban 
to show up in the night to post a letter on a village wall.   
Attempts to destroy Taliban members in areas does not equate to destroying 
Taliban influence in an area.  The Taliban can easily rely on their message that the 
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Afghan government cannot protect you and collaborating with U.S. forces will lead to 
death, when they can operate in such a fluid fashion.  Such an example of how easy the 
Taliban can carry out this strategy was evident when in May 2006 a U.S. airstrike “killed 
24 suspected Taliban along with 16 civilians, wails of mourning were mixed with sighs 
of relief that the Taliban might finally have been defeated. But then the night letters 
resumed, warning villagers not to become puppets of the American "infidels." Two 
weeks later, the Taliban seized two local police officers accused of collaborating with the 
government. Within two hours, they were publicly tried, sentenced and beheaded.”30    
The Taliban will be able to continue its use of night letters in its information 
strategy so long as they are free to move and operate where there are no U.S. forces 
present or Afghan government forces present.  While efforts should continue to eradicate 
Taliban members, it must not be looked upon as the way to undermine the Taliban’s 
ability to influence the population.  Night letters do far more to sow fear among the 
Afghans than airstrikes do to make them feel secure. 
2. Technology 
The Taliban have a monopoly on access to the population and the ability to 
communicate to them effectively through their use of night letters, but that is not the only 
methods the Taliban employ to reach their audience.  Other means to convey their 
messages are DVD distribution, cell phone messaging, radio messages and websites.  All 
of these techniques have found their way into the Taliban arsenal.   
Night letters are a rather unsophisticated method of delivering the Taliban 
messages.  The Taliban have their own publication to attract a greater audience than just 
the village they are trying to influence through their night letters.  The first publication 
was Azam and it was published in Pashtu and Dari, the main languages spoken in 
southern and eastern areas of Afghanistan, where the Taliban enjoy the most support.  
That publication is no longer in existence due to the arrest of its publisher.  This 
information is according to another publication that is still publishing called al-Somood 
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(al-Sumud).   Al-Somood is an Arabic language magazine published by the Taliban 
monthly.31   The fact that al-Somood is published in Arabic is a clear indication that the 
Taliban are trying to reach a broader audience.  It is noted that this is probably the 
editor’s second language as the Arabic is fairly rudimentary.  There are other 
publications, however they only seem to be supportive of the Taliban and not actually 
published by them.   
The use of DVDs to spread propaganda by the Taliban is a new phenomenon that 
they most likely learned by observing al-Qaeda.   The Taliban distribute DVDs 
containing video footage of attacks against coalition troops and Afghan forces.  Another 
reason the Taliban have for distributing DVDs is to visually refute claims made against 
them.  The purpose is to discredit government proclamations and continue to show the 
population that the government cannot protect them.  An example of this type of use of 
DVDs is when in 2008 a DVD was distributed that had an interview with Jalaluddin 
Haqqani, who was reported as dead, and two of Haqqani’s commanders each mocking 
the reports of their death.32    The video footage of these rebukes gives the Taliban a 
simple means to give credence to their messages that the government is ineffective at 
dealing with the Taliban.   DVDs are mostly distributed in the larger cities due to the fact 
that these are the areas where the most computers and DVD players are available for 
viewing them.   
The DVDs are often distributed across the border in Pakistan for recruiting 
purposes.  The Taliban recruit from areas inside Pakistan such as Baluchistan and 
Karachi.  Here, the Taliban ensure the DVDs are available in specific madrassas from 
which they recruit.  Mullah Omar embraced this technology as a way to highlight Taliban 
heroes and their efforts to draw recruits from Pakistan.  Mullah Dadullah was dispatched 
by Mullah Omar for such a recruiting mission.  Dadullah was a well-known fighter who 
had fought against the Soviets and suffered many wounds during his fighting.  
“Dadullah’s very savagery, filmed and now often circulated on videotape, coupled with 
his promotional flair, were just the ingredients Omar needed to put the Taliban back on 
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the map.”33   Dadullah was ultimately killed in 2007.  Efforts such as this, demonstrate 
the Taliban’s and Mullah Omar’s understanding of how such technology can be 
effectively employed to solicit support.   
The internet is another technology that the Taliban now embrace.  While their use 
is not as sophisticated as al-Qaeda’s use of the internet, they are making strides.  The 
Taliban have a website called Al Emarah (The Emirate), but its design is very simple.  
The simplicity may be done for expedience rather than lack of knowledge.  This is 
because there are efforts to keep the website from operating however when there are 
successful attempts to shut the site down, it reappears later hosted on a new server. The 
website is available in five languages and mostly contains video of attacks, articles, and 
commentary for reporting events.  Unlike other jihadist groups, its website does not have 
messages beyond jihad.  This could indicate the Taliban’s more local focus, as opposed to 
al-Qaeda’s global focus.  Another reason that the website may be so simple is because 
there are so few computers with internet access in Afghanistan that it is not an effective 
means to reach a large Afghan audience.      
Other methods that the Taliban have employed in their efforts to spread their 
message have been radio broadcasts and cell phone messaging (SMS or “texting”).  The 
Taliban have had little success with radio broadcasting due to their lack of being able to 
maintain a fixed broadcasting station inside Afghanistan coupled with the ability of 
coalition forces to jam the frequencies that they would transmit.  “American military and 
intelligence personnel are working to jam the unlicensed radio stations in Pakistan's 
lawless regions on the Afghanistan border that Taliban fighters use to broadcast threats 
and decrees.”34   Cell phone messages are becoming more ubiquitous as cell phone 
ownership is reported to be at 52% of the total Afghan population.  This method seems to 
be the 21st century equivalent of a night letter for the Taliban.    
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The Taliban have embraced technologies they once viewed as un-Islamic.  This 
change of heart may have to do with the position the Taliban are now in, that is out of 
power trying and needing to gather support to confront U.S. forces.  Some insight may be 
shed onto the why the Taliban now embrace such technologies in an interview conducted 
by a New York Times reporter with an Afghan man referred to as A.  “Mullah Dadullah is 
now a folk hero for young Talibs like A. And all the Taliban I met told me that every 
time Dadullah gives another interview or appears on the battlefield, it serves as an instant 
injection of inspiration.”35    
The acceptance of new technologies may have more to do with sustaining internal 
moral and increasing recruitment than a change in religious philosophy.  As Dadullah’s 
use of technology has shown, the Taliban are willing to change their acceptance of new 
ideas if they appear to assist the Taliban in achieving their aims.  Beside the need to 
sustain moral, the Taliban most likely realized they need to adapt their use of information 
tools to compete against the Afghan government and U.S. forces.  When the Taliban rose 
to power, Afghanistan was devastated by the war against the Soviet Union.  The current 
technologies did not exist yet and as such the Taliban saw no need to embrace them in 
order to exert influence.  Since their overthrow, Afghanistan has seen an influx of new 
technologies as a result of reconstruction efforts.  Whether the Taliban agree with these 
tools use or not has not been determined.  They realize that in order to convey a message, 
they must expand into the areas where their audience is present.   
By Dadullah’s example, it was shown that new technologies could be effective in 
reaching new recruits.  The Taliban understand that whether they agree with the 
technologies or not they must accept their use to more effectively reach the people.  If the 
Taliban were to ever return to power they may again one day ban the use of such 
technologies but as long as they are out of power they seem to be willing to embrace their 
use.   
                                                 
35  Rubin, “In the Land of the Taliban,” 7.  
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D. COORDINATED MESSAGING  
The Taliban have been embracing technology to spread their messages for various 
reasons.  The result has been that many more Taliban are voicing their opinions and as 
such this is leading to a disconnection in what they are saying.  According to Jacob, in his 
book The Rise, Fall and Resurgence of the Taliban, despite the fact that in June 2003, 
Taliban leader Mullah Omar had set up a Leadership Council to coordinate attacks in 
Afghanistan; the rapidly re-emerging Taliban do not seem to be a single, monolithic 
force.  There is friction between 'moderates' and extremists, and between those who want 
to join the government and those who are opposed to such an idea.  The two main factors 
causing the schism are the difference in the degree of religious extremism and the 
influence of Pakistan on the movement.  
This schism is leading to the disconnection of the Taliban’s messages. The 
Taliban have also suffered from a “deeds not matching the words” syndrome.  As 
discussed earlier the Taliban have claimed that they do not condone opium harvest and 
production yet there is ample evidence to suggest otherwise.  The Taliban now provide 
security to poppy farmers in order to collect money to support their efforts against the 
U.S. forces and Afghan government forces.  Despite this, they still claim that they have 
nothing to do with poppy cultivation.   
In the spring of 2009, the Taliban established and distributed a Code of Conduct 
for its members to follow.  This code covers rules such as not torturing prisoners, 
avoiding civilian casualties and inviting and welcoming into the Taliban those Afghans 
who have worked for the Afghan government under President Karzai.  These rules are a 
way to address through words how the Taliban should act, yet these rules were developed 
to demonstrate that the Taliban do not condone the actions that their followers have 




The Taliban are framing issues that resonate with the people.  These issues were 
successful in bringing the Taliban to power once before and they seem to believe using 
these themes will bring them back into power.  There is a flaw in the Taliban’s use of 
these themes in their current attempts to control Afghanistan.  The first time they came 
into power using the themes of establishing sharia, ending corruption, and establishing 
peace, the Taliban were an unknown element.  People wanted to believe that they could 
bring about what they said they could.  The Taliban were able to bring about what it said 
it would do, however, once the people experienced Taliban rule they were not happy with 
the tradeoffs life under Taliban rule required.  As the Taliban now try to regain power 
using the same themes, the people are aware of what sacrifices would be made to live 
under their rule.  The Taliban were able to convince people to support their rise the first 
time because they were tired of war and corruption and were ready for peace.  This time 
the people are more fearful of what would happen if the Taliban were to return to power. 
The methods by which the Taliban disseminate their messages have evolved not 
only from the first time they took control but also over the past eight years of war.  They 
continue to have a firm control in disseminating night letters and the lack of physical U.S. 
or Afghan government security forces in all areas allows the Taliban to move freely and 
appear to be in all places at once.  New tools to disseminate messages allow the Taliban 
to effectively reach greater audiences and also give the impression that they are 
successful.  This acceptance of technological tools to effectively reach new and wider 
audiences has also led to the Taliban appearing un-coordinated.  As more Taliban 
members appear in videos and give interviews, the more likely that what one sees is 
individual opinions, idea and perceptions and those opinions, ideas or perceptions do not 
always align with the message that Mullah Omar or other high level Taliban leadership 
are pronouncing.   
Overall, the Taliban understand the usefulness of cultural framing to connect with 
the Afghan people.  They have accepted new tools to reach their audience.  What the 
Taliban currently lacks appears to be a coordinated effort to update their themes nested to 
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an overarching policy that would explain why the Afghan people should support their 
efforts to return to power.  The absence of a plan demonstrating how the Taliban would 
govern in a manner that improved the lives of the people, only leaves the people with the 
perception of how life was under the Taliban previously.  The Taliban must convince the 
population to stop trusting and to stop supporting the current government and security 
forces as well as obtaining overt support from the people in order to achieve their goals.  
The Taliban reliance on stroking fear is only useful in spreading a sense of discontent but 
not in obtaining the support necessary to return to power.   
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III. EFFECTS OF THE TALIBAN INFORMATION STRATEGY 
A. WHAT IS THE INFORMATION REACH OF THE TALIBAN? 
The Taliban have the market cornered on influencing the population of a specific 
town or village through their night letters.  The Taliban’s other methods of influence, 
such as DVD videos and an on-line magazine, do not seem to offer much in the way of 
reaching a broad audience however.  Polling data from a 2009 report details the 
penetration of the various sources through which the Afghan people receive their news 
and information.  This is covered below.   
Overall, the past few years in Afghanistan have seen an increase in ownership of 
televisions, cell phones, and computers.  The ownership of radios has remained steady.  
These are the main technological sources of information through which the population of 
Afghanistan receives their information.  The rise in ownership of these devices has led 
the Taliban to increase its use of these means of communication, as was discussed in the 
last chapter.  The benefit of using cell phones and computers for the Taliban is that they 
are harder for U.S. forces and the Afghan government to completely deny the Taliban.  
The Taliban’s most widely used and effective message delivery tool, the night letter, 
provides them an outlet that comprises how 26% of Afghans receive their news, which is 
through friends, family, community leaders or religious leaders.  Despite the Taliban’s 
acceptance of new technological tools and older methods such as night letters, they have 
been unable to garner any additional support from the population for their return to 
power.  
To understand if the Taliban are using the best methods to disseminate their 
messages we first need to look at what means of receiving information the population of 
Afghanistan possesses.  Table 1 is a depiction of household possession of radio, TV, 
mobile phone and computer for Afghanistan as a whole and broken down between rural 
and urban areas. 
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Table 1.   Household ownership of technologies (From Afghanistan in 2009:  
A Survey of the Afghan People)36 
Table 1 shows that the radio is the most prominent technology source owned by 
the overall population.  A radio is owned by 81% of the total population in both rural and 
urban areas.  This is followed, second, by the mobile phone with 29% less ownership 
than the radio.  The most widely owned conduit for messaging, the radio, is practically 
untouched by the Taliban in Afghanistan.  The Taliban are however increasing their reach 
by actively using messaging capabilities provided by the ever-increasing proliferation of 
cell phones.  Table 2 looks at how the ownership of the technologies depicted in Table 1 
have changed over the last three years starting in 2007. 
                                                 
36 Ruth Rennie, Sudhindra Sharma, and Sen Pawan, “Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan 
People,” The Asia Foundation (2009): 142, 




Table 2.   Household technologies in functioning order  
(From Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People)37 
As Table 2 shows, since 2007 radio ownership has declined 7%, while mobile 
phone ownership has risen by 10%.  The increase in mobile phone ownership is 
important to watch because it provides an outlet for information dissemination the 
Taliban are utilizing to effectively compete with U.S. forces and the Afghan government 
in reaching the population.   
Radio and TV are the leading sources of how the Afghan population receives 
information about what is occurring in their country.    The reliance on either radio or TV 
is different between rural or urban areas though and do not constitute the only sources of 
information consumption as Table 3 depicts; mobile phones and computers are also 
gaining prominence. 
 
                                                 
37 Rennie et al., “Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People,” 143. 
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Table 3.   Main source of information  
(From Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People)38  
 “Radio remains the main source of information for the majority of rural residents 
(53%), while most urban residents identify TV (62%) as their most important information 
source.  Recourse to friends, family, and neighbors as the principle source of information 
on national and local events is more than twice as high in rural areas (20%) as in urban 
areas (9%).”39  The reason for such a high percentage of people receiving their 
information from radio and TV is because Afghanistan has such low literacy rates, 
especially among women.  The Taliban must find other means to distribute their 
messages, because the Afghan government has great influence over radio, the medium 
which the majority of people use to receive their news.  Their usage of DVDs and audio 
tapes is an indicator of their ability to adapt to the information environment.  The 
Taliban’s disadvantage is that very few people have access to a DVD player, which is 
usually included with a computer and owned by only 6% of the population, as depicted in 
Table 2.  It is possible that the Taliban hope that those who do watch their DVDs will 
spread the information from DVDs to their friends, which 18% of the population use to 
receive information.  The Taliban seem to be making the most of their information 
                                                 
38  Rennie et al., “Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People,” 142. 
39  Ibid., 142. 
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strategy by utilizing the outlets that remain to them.  Those outlets are the combined 26% 
of information sources between friends/family/neighbors and community leaders/ village 
chiefs per Table 3.    
B. ARE THE TALIBAN’S MESSAGES RESONATING WITH THE 
POPULATION? 
The Taliban information strategy focuses on establishing sharia law, the lack of 
security in the country, and government corruption.  Polling data gathered by the Asia 
Foundation in 2009 queried the Afghan population about the direction they thought the 
country was headed.  The data revealed that two of the Taliban’s themes, security and 
corruption, played an important role in their thoughts.  The establishment of sharia is not 
mentioned but could be a factor in their view of the government.  Table 4 presents the 
overall perception the Afghans have about the direction of their country.   
 
 
Table 4.   Direction Afghanistan is heading  
(From Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People)40  
                                                 
40  Rennie et al., “Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People,” 16. 
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The percentage of the country that thinks Afghanistan is headed in the right 
direction has remained relatively consistent over the four years the survey was taken.  
Although the percentage rose between 200 and 2009 it remains comparatively similar to 
past years.  The percentage of those who say the country is heading in the wrong 
direction however has risen during the four years the poll has been taken.  The recent 
downturn in respondents who feel the country is heading in the wrong direction is 
positive but may be a too soon to draw any substantive conclusions from until a new poll 
is taken to see if the numbers increase or decrease.   
A better way to understand the percentage of the population who feels the country 
is heading in the wrong direction is to look at the data concerning why they think the 
country is heading in the wrong direction.  Table 5 depicts this information. 
 
 
Table 5.   Reason the country is heading in the wrong direction  
(From Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People)41  
 
Insecurity is the top reason given by the Afghan population for why they think the 
country is heading in the wrong direction.  The Taliban play a great role in why that is the 
top reason.  The Taliban conduct activities that give the impression that the government 
                                                 
41  Rennie et al., “Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People,” 18. 
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cannot provide security, while at the same time convey to the people through their 
messaging that the government cannot provide security.  The population’s perception of 
security is currently almost completely controlled by the Taliban.  The Taliban cause 
insecurity then highlight that insecurity throughout the country.  By conducting 
operations that demonstrate the inability of the Afghan government to protect the people 
and then capturing video of events showing their claims, the Taliban may be effectively 
changing people’s views of the direction Afghanistan is heading.   
The next reason provided for why the country is headed in the wrong direction is 
bad government.  Bad government includes inability to provide for the people and 
effectively manage resources.  Those who see little in terms of reconstruction occurring 
in their area may think this is due to the inability of the government to properly manage 
reconstruction projects.   There is a possibility that the Taliban could use this bad 
government sentiment to explain that a government guided by sharia would not allow this 
to happen.  Although the Taliban do not have the direct capability to continue to 
exacerbate this sentiment the way they do insecurity, there remains an opening for them 
to try and capitalize on this perception through messaging.   The third reason provided for 
why the country is headed in the wrong direction is corruption.  The Taliban have been 
able to use this theme when they rose to power and as they highlight the theme again they 
can elevate the feelings of discontent among the people against the government.   
The reason with the lowest percentage (7%) for why the country is heading in the 
wrong direction is the presence of the Taliban.  Does the Afghan population not see the 
Taliban as a long-term threat and therefore not a significant reason to think the country is 
heading the wrong way?  The people may see the Taliban as a presence that exists only 
until the other reasons are addressed, such as bad government and corruption.  Without 
the presence of those two reasons the Taliban would have fewer grievances to highlight 
and draw support from the people for their cause.  If this happened, the Taliban’s support 
may dry up and the people may think the Taliban would just go away.  The other reasons 
must be addressed but the main components that make up the Taliban information 
strategy would be removed.   
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C. TALIBAN EFFECTIVENESS OF TURNING THE POPULATION 
AGAINST U.S.  AND  AFGHAN FORCES 
The Taliban’s most successful theme in their information strategy is their 
contention that the government and U.S. forces are unable to provide security.  This is 
evident by the high percentage of those who believe the country is heading in the wrong 
direction.  As stated earlier, the Taliban currently have the most direct influence over this 
perception.  The ability of the Taliban to operate and intermingle among the Pashtun 
areas of both Afghanistan and Pakistan provide them a freedom of movement that 
enables them to hide from security forces.  This ability allows them to continue their 
violent, intimidating, and illegal activities, thus perpetuating the notion that the Afghan 
security forces or U.S. forces cannot provide security.  According to the Asia Foundation 
“The majority of respondents have a positive perception of the security situation in their 
local area in the North West (86%), Central/Kabul (78%), Central/Hazarajat (77%), 
North East (76%) and East (70%). On the other hand, more than half of respondents say 
that security in their local area is quite bad or very bad in the West (55%), South East 
(62%), and South West (65%) regions.”42  The areas with the highest perception of a 
poor security situation are the areas where the Taliban are operating.   
The BBC conducted a poll in 2009 querying the Afghan population on specific 
issues relating to the presence of NATO forces.  Their poll (Table 6) shows that support 
to U.S. and ISAF forces are on a downward trend, while opposition to those same forces 
has been increasing since 2006. 
 
                                                 
42  Rennie et al., “Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People,” 15. 
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Table 6.   Support of Coalition forces by the Afghan people  
(From Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People)43  
The trend appears to correspond to the timeframe of when the Taliban were 
increasing their activity level thus giving rise to their claim that the U.S. and Afghan 
security forces could not provide security to the people.  The Asia Foundation polled the 
population on their level of fear in participating in various activities such as approaching 
the police, participating in peaceful demonstrations or travelling throughout the country.  
Almost half in each region polled feared approaching a member of the Afghan National 
Police (ANP).  The areas citing the most fear again come from the areas that Taliban 
mostly operate.  See Table 7. 
 
                                                 
43 Anon, “2009 BBC Afghanistan Poll,” BBC: 10, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/05_02_09afghan_poll_2009.pdf (accessed October 30, 2009). 
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Table 7.   Public’s level of fear  
(From Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People)44  
These numbers indicate that the Taliban’s messages are effectively influencing 
the view of the population in the regions where U.S. and Afghan security forces are 
based.   The population’s acceptance of the U.S. presence is also on a downward trend 
according to the BBC poll in Table 8.   
                                                 
44  Rennie et al., “Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People,” 38. 
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Table 8.   When should U.S. forces withdraw from Afghanistan  
(From 2009 BBC Afghanistan Poll)45  
The population appears to be losing trust in the U.S. as the upward trend of those 
who believe the U.S. should leave between now and within the next 12 months as well as 
a downward trend in those who think the U.S. shouldn’t leave until security is restored.  
These trends work in the Taliban’s favor for pursuing an information strategy that 
underscores the perception that the U.S. forces are another foreign occupying power that 
needs to be driven from Afghanistan.   
D. DOES THE POPULATION SUPPORT THE TALIBAN’S AIMS? 
A key question that needs to be addressed is whether or not the Afghan people are 
supporting the Taliban aims.  The people of Afghanistan do appear, based on the Asia 
Foundation polling data, to consider their country heading in the wrong direction.  The 
top three reasons for this belief correspond to the themes of the Taliban information 
strategy.  Do the Taliban then have the support of the people, if their themes match the 
concerns of the people?    
Polling data does indicate that the population believes the Taliban are growing 
stronger.  Table 9 below seems to give credence to David Killcullen’s description of the 
                                                 
45 Anon, “2009 BBC Afghanistan Poll,” 13. 
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Taliban in an interview he gave for the New Yorker.  “They’re essentially armed 
propaganda organizations,” Kilcullen said. “They switch between guerrilla activity and 
terrorist activity as they need to, in order to maintain the political momentum, and it’s all 
about an information operation that generates the perception of an unstoppable, growing 
insurgency.”46   The Taliban are able to capitalize on the growing perceptions that they 
have created within the population, which gives the impression that they are on the rise.  
This perception is most accepted in the areas where the Taliban are operating. 
 
 
Table 9.   Perception of the Taliban strength  
(From Afghanistan in 2009: A Survey of the Afghan People)47  
There may be a perception that the Taliban are getting stronger, however that may 
not indicate that the Taliban have gained any more support for their group.  Two 
questions posed by the BBC poll indicate that the Taliban have done nothing to 
demonstrate to the Afghan people that they should be given support.  In fact it appears 
the opposite has occurred.  The Afghan people as indicated in earlier polls may be 
showing less support for U.S. forces but according to Table 10,  the Taliban have also 
appeared to the population as posing a greater threat to their security. 
 
                                                 
46 George Packer, “Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Redefine the ‘War on Terror’?” The 
New Yorker, December 11, 2006: 4, http://quixotism.files.wordpress.com/2007/03/the-new-yorker-
knowing-the-enemy.pdf (accessed June 14, 2009). 
47  Anon, “2009 BBC Afghanistan Poll,” 11. 
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Table 10.   Biggest danger to Afghanistan (From 2009 BBC Afghanistan Poll)48 
Even though the trend may be upward in the belief that U.S. forces should leave, 
Table 10 suggests that over the last three years the percentage of the population that sees 
the U.S. as posing the biggest threat is steady.  In contrast the Taliban are viewed by a 
greater portion of the population as the largest threat to their country.  The Taliban may 
be successful in their information strategy to paint the U.S. as another occupying force 
that needs to be removed from Afghanistan, but it has not translated into the U.S. being 
viewed as a great threat requiring an uprising to throw the U.S. forces out.   
When asked the question if the Taliban have become more moderate in their 
views, a quarter of the respondents believed they had.   
 
                                                 
48 Anon, “2009 BBC Afghanistan Poll,” 8. 
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Table 11.   Impression of whether or not the Taliban have changed  
(From 2009 BBC Afghanistan Poll)49 
This view could mean that Taliban’s efforts to embrace new technological 
methods, they once forbade, and their need to recruit new fighters has been successful in 
changing people’s perceptions of them as a group.  The next poll indicates that although 
the perceptions of the groups have changed people still do not wish to see them come 
back into power.   
 
Table 12.    Who would the population prefer rule Afghanistan  
(From2009 BBC Afghanistan Poll)50 
                                                 
49 Anon, “2009 BBC Afghanistan Poll,” 12. 
50 Ibid.,  8. 
 45
E. CONCLUSION  
The Taliban’s information strategy appears effective in influencing the population 
along its main themes.  Support for U.S. forces and Afghan government has dwindled, 
but the Taliban have not been successful in convincing the population that they offer a 
better alternative.  The Taliban’s reach is severely restricted in the country’s most 
abundant information source, the radio.  It also has limited or no ability to broadcast a 
message by television.  As cell phones and computers are becoming more commonplace, 
the Taliban have initiated methods and devised tactics to use these devices to more 
effectively communicate their messages.   
The population of Afghanistan is increasingly feeling their country is headed in 
the wrong direction, mostly due to their sense of insecurity.  The Taliban efforts to 
increase attacks and then distribute video footage of those attacks as well as more 
interviews with Taliban leaders is contributing to this overall perception of the country 
heading in the wrong direction.  These same methods are used to exacerbate the feeling 
that U.S. and Afghan security forces are unable to provide security.  These factors have 
most likely  had the effect of the population increasingly opposing the presence of U.S. 
forces and fearing Afghan Police forces.   
Despite the Taliban efforts to convince the people to support the withdrawal of 
U.S. forces and delegitimize the Afghan government, the people do not seem convinced 
that these forces are the biggest threat.  The Taliban continue to be unable to convince the 
people that if they were to return to power things would be better than the last time they 
ruled.  While the Taliban themes may resonate with the Afghan people, the people still 
seem to be willing to tolerate a foreign presence and give the central government a 
chance to succeed.  More importantly the people seem to overwhelmingly view the 
Taliban as the major threat and do not wish to see their return to power.   
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IV.   RECOMMENDATIONS/CONCLUSION 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter contains recommendations based on the content addressed in the 
previous chapters.  In addressing the Taliban information strategy, recommendations are 
culled from observations and discussions written by individuals who have experience or a 
voice in  policy or information operations.  In addition to these individuals mentioned, 
reports from journalists on their experiences in Afghanistan as well as organizations 
conducting studies of Afghanistan will be considered.  
The recommendations included in this chapter offer possible options  for the 
information environment and do not attempt to recommend policy changes.  As policies 
do change, so too will the need to adjust the information strategy to support those 
changes.  The information strategy recommendations  offered here suggest ways to deal 
with the policies that already exist and the tactics and operations the Taliban are using to 
their advantage.  The 2009 ISAF Commander’s initial assessment report talks about the 
need to more aggressively confront the Taliban information strategy.   
IA more forceful and offensive StratCom [Strategic Communications] 
approach must be devised whereby INS [insurgents] are exposed 
continually for their cultural and religious violations, anti-Islamic and 
indiscriminate use of violence and terror, and by concentrating on their 
vulnerabilities.  These include their causing of the majority of civilian 
casualties, attacks on education, development projects, and government 
institutions, and flagrant contravention of the principles of the Koran.51  
The U.S. must understand the limits with which they will have to contend .  Such 
limits include the lack of modern infrastructure in Afghanistan.  The lack of infrastructure 
hinders the ability of the U.S. and the Afghan government to counter the Taliban’s 
message in the rural areas and is not likely to improve in the near future.  If security 
                                                 
51 Stanley McChrystal, “COMISAF’S Initial Assessment,” Headquarters International Security 
Assistance Force, August 30, 2009: D-4, http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109.pdf?sid=ST2009092003140 (accessed November 
14, 2009). 
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forces do not maintain a permanent presence in certain areas, then government or U.S. 
provided radios for the people may result in death if they are caught with one in their 
home by members of the Taliban.  Perhaps the best way to reach these areas is through 
word of mouth.  Word of mouth, however, will only be effective if the words match the 
deeds. 
To deal with the Taliban information strategy, one should look at three options.  
Those options are first to counter what the Taliban are saying.  This is effective if the 
Taliban are lying, however not everything they say is a lie.  At the least it may not be 
perceived as a lie to their target audience.  The second option is to ignore what the 
Taliban are saying.  This is best used if the Taliban seem to be attempting to cause a 
reaction to their claims that would give them credibility.  The third option is to amplify 
what the Taliban say.  The Taliban need support from the population in order to persist.  
As polling data has shown, the Taliban are not viewed favorably by the population, thus 
they say things to gain support but may not actually do what they say.  Amplifying what 
they say for the purpose of demonstrating their hypocrisy can be an effective way to 
eliminate support for them.   
1. Countering the Taliban Message 
The Taliban understand the information environment in which they operate.  They 
know that due to the lack of alternative information sources available to the population 
they can exaggerate claims they make on their actions.  Foxley points this out in his 
work.   
False or inaccurate claims can work in the Taliban’s favour. A large part 
of the local Afghan and Pakistani audiences that they are communicating 
to, particularly those in the Pashtun tribal belt on both sides of the 
Afghan–Pakistani border, are either poorly educated, sympathetic to the 
Taliban or have limited access to public information sources, preventing 
confirmation of the claims made. Much of this audience is prepared to 
give credence to Taliban claims more or less regardless of their 
plausibility.52    
                                                 
52 Foxley, “The Taliban’s Propaganda Activities: How Well is the Afghan Insurgency Communicating 
and What Is It Saying?” 6. 
 49
Embellishing  claims is not a misunderstanding of the facts, but rather a deliberate 
effort by the Taliban to be the first to get the story out.  The Taliban realize that with few 
media present in the regions they operate, there is little ability to cross check the “facts” 
that the Taliban provide.  News media outlets receive information about an event and 
report it, no matter who the source.  The International Crisis Group’s Asia Report states 
that  
…the information minister under the Taliban regime, Quadratullah Jamal, 
boasted of a proactive approach: The most prominent Afghan specialists 
admit in their interviews that the Taliban media activities are very quick 
and reactive when journalists ask us for information. The Karzai media … 
are much weaker and cannot compete with us. Journalists confirm that 
when they ask the ministry of defence to give information about a 
particular event, it takes 24 hours to get the answer, while we can give the 
information through satellite phones in a record time.53    
Fact checking is not a priority for the Taliban. 
The statement by Jamal is confirmed by Lieutenant Colonel Shawn Stroud, 
Director of Strategic Communication at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center.  He is 
quoted in an article by the Council of Foreign Relations as saying 
U.S. field commanders need the tools to combat counterproductive 
messaging quickly, like speaking directly to the news media or even 
filming operations and posting their own combat footage online before the 
Taliban can. "It's almost like we've surrendered the information battlefield 
and said, 'Well, we don't play by the same rules as them because we have 
to tell the truth,' " Stroud says. "The key is, we've got to be first with the 
truth. So we've got to build systems that do that.54   
The confirmation by U.S. personnel that the Taliban are more effective at getting their 
message out should give reason for concern.  The Taliban are putting forth falsehoods 
and the media are reporting it as firsthand accounts.  The problem with this is not so 
much that they report what they are given.  The real problem lies with the inability for the 
                                                 
53  Anon, “Asia Report: Taliban Propaganda—Winning the War of Words?” 9. 
54 Greg Bruno, “Winning the Information War in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, May 11, 2009, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/19330/winning_the_information_war_in_afghanistan_and_pakistan.html?br
eadcrumb=%2F (accessed June 15, 2009). 
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media to properly check the facts they are given by Taliban sources and that coalition 
forces are slow to respond to those false or unconfirmed reports.  By the time the U.S. 
forces or Afghan government have all the facts, the story has moved on and is does not 
get reported.  This leaves the audience to believe what was reported but not countered. 
One of the key components of the Taliban information strategy is their claim to 
establishing law throughout Afghanistan based on sharia.  The overall idea of sharia 
based law may seem ideal to a certain percentage of the population, however the Taliban 
conduct activities that can be used to discredit them and counter that claim.  The Taliban 
have in the past killed Muslim clerics who spoke out against the Taliban’s religious 
authority and their un-Islamic activities.   
Efforts should be taken to find Afghan clerics who are willing to speak out against 
the Taliban and offer a counter-narrative to what the Taliban are saying.  The Kandahar 
Ulema-u-Shura consists of 15 member clerics who have come out against the Taliban.  
This Shura edict concerning the Taliban stated: 
They are saying that foreign troops have captured our country and they are 
calling to start a jihad against them. Just by using the name of jihad, they 
are killing as many people as they want.  Respected Muslim brothers, you 
know the situation: you are witnesses that the president of our country is a 
Muslim, and his vice presidents and all members of the cabinet and 
government authorities are Muslims," the edict reads. "No one has said 
you should stop going to the mosque or stop praying, so for what reason is 
this a place of fighting?55 
When religious authorities in Afghanistan speak out against the Taliban, their 
edicts need to be disseminated through whatever the appropriate means would be to a 
specific target audience.  The people need to hear opposing views and engage in 
discussions about the validity of the Taliban’s claims to religious authority.  This counter-
narrative can also be exploited to bring to light the Taliban’s unwillingness to recognize 
any religious interpretations other than their own.   
                                                 
55 Carlotta Gall, “Taliban Try to Frighten Afghan Voters in Rural Areas,” New York Times, February 
19, 2004: 1, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/19/world/taliban-try-to-frighten-afghan-voters-in-rural-
areas.html?scp=1&sq=Taliban%20try%20to%20frighten%20afghan%20voters%20in%20rural%20areas&s
t=cse (accessed October 22, 2009). 
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Countering the Taliban narrative requires more than just disseminating facts to 
disprove Taliban claims.  As stated before, the information environment that exists in 
Afghanistan gives advantage to the side that gets its message out first, whether truthful or 
not.  The U.S. and Afghan government cannot wait to be reactive to Taliban claims.  It is 
necessary to be properly positioned to disseminate information out as soon as possible in 
order to take away the Taliban information domain advantage.  Information 
dissemination must occur at the lowest level possible in Afghanistan.  Due to the reliance 
on word of mouth and exchange of information through personal contacts, the lowest 
level unit on the ground in direct contact with the population is how information can be 
transmitted most effectively.  Those in daily contact with the population will be able to 
not only disseminate information but they will also be able to gather information about 
groups like the Kandahar Ulema-a-Shura and attempt to persuade the people to listen to 
their statements.   
Another option to countering the Taliban information strategy is to address their 
claims of establishing stability where they rule.  Afghans have already experienced life 
under the Taliban and that experience should be taken advantage of and exploited.  The 
Taliban’s local leadership needs to be challenged at every opportunity to explain their 
plans for the future.  This approach can be especially effective in areas where only 
coalition forces are located.  Tribal leaders could invite the Taliban to a meeting to 
discuss what they would offer in terms of development and policy issues compared to 
what the coalition is offering, and where Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are 
located are already providing.  This approach will help the tribal elders explain to their 
people, who really are the better option for their future well being.   
2. Ignore Taliban Statements 
The Taliban often make outrageous claims about their success in battles and the 
casualties they have inflicted.  It is  easy to offer a counter narrative because the counter 
narrative can be supported by facts or eyewitness accounts.  TheThe Taliban makes 
claims that are much harder to counter and in certain cases those claims may be correct.  
An example of such claims concern corruption in the government.  Corruption exists in 
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the Afghan government, and efforts must be taken to correct the situation. but it will take 
time to be corrected.  The Taliban use government corruption as a main point in their 
information strategy to turn the population away from supporting the government.  It is 
important to realize the situation exists.  Ignoring the Taliban statements of corruption is 
useful in reducing their ability to use the counter narrative against the government or 
claim the U.S. is supporting a corrupt government.   
The problems of corruption within the government must be dealt with, and the 
people must see visible signs that corruption is being eradicated.  The information 
strategist must not attempt to discredit Taliban claims on corruption until the population 
perceives a significant decrease in government corruption.  Methods such as highlighting 
new projects and Afghan security forces performing well may assist in helping reduce the 
perception of corruption without trying to directly counter any Taliban claims of 
corruption.  The people need to see their government providing for them and improving 
their situation; this will do more for changing perceptions then attempting to convince the 
population through messaging that the government is combating corruption.   
3. Amplifying the Taliban Message 
Amplifying what the Taliban are saying may appear to be counter intuitive to 
discrediting the Taliban information strategy.  The Taliban have taken actions to 
demonstrate that they act in a manner consistent with Muslim teachings.  Their actions, 
however, may suggest otherwise.  A recent example of the Taliban trying to improve 
their reputation has been the issuance of a Code of Conduct.  This Code of Conduct was 
issued to guide all Taliban members in their actions in the conduct of operations.  The 
Code covers topics such as how to treat prisoners and enemy collaborators, how internal 
mujahedeen issues will be handles, and how the Taliban establish governing bodies.    
The Code of Conduct is a way to demonstrate to the population that the Taliban are to 
“good guys.”   
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Amplifying what the Taliban include in the Code of Conduct is a way to let the 
population see the difference between what the Taliban say and what they do.  A U.S. 
military spokesman in Afghanistan described the code of conduct during a CNN 
interview this way. 
Lt. Cmdr. Christine Sidenstricker said it was notable that the document is 
intended to be "prescriptive on how the bad guys are supposed to conduct 
themselves." "Their day to day actions contradict everything in it," 
Sidenstricker said. "The long and the short of it is, they don't operate in 
accordance to their code of conduct."  
She said more than 60 percent of civilians killed have been killed by the 
Taliban, and since January, more than 450 innocent Afghans have been 
killed and more than 1,000 others have been injured.  Also, half the 
casualties resulting from roadside bombs were civilians. 
"The booklet also says suicide attacks should always be done against high-
ranking officials. In reality, they have killed more then 200 Afghan 
civilians."56   
The Code of Conduct is one example of how it could be useful to amplify what 
the Talaiban are saying. The benefit of amplifying their Code of Conduct is that their 
words do not match their actions.  The more people who are exposed to this document 
and what the Taliban are saying the more the people can use the Taliban’s words against 
them.  It may be more difficult to recruit new members if those who may be willing to 
join find the Taliban hypocritical in their words and deeds thus decide not to join the 
Taliban.   
The Taliban offer other areas where their messages may not be in line with their 
actions.  The Taliban’s support of Opium harvesting and production is an area that may 
be appropriate for amplification.  In 2001, the Taliban reduced opium harvests because 
heroin production was un-Islamic.  Now, however the Taliban benefit from the opium 
harvest financially to support their efforts.  The Taliban have made statements that they 
                                                 
56 Anon, “New Taliban Rule Book Calls for Fewer Suicide Attacks,” CNN.com, July 30 2009, 
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do not have any role in poppy production.  These claims can be very useful in areas 
where the population sees their involvement and can refute these claims.  By amplifying 
the Taliban’s message, they in essence would be doing the work for the Afghan 
government and U.S. forces by providing the messaging material that could then be used 
against them.   
B. CONCLUSION 
Despite the current belief of a resurgent Taliban, they are no more capable of 
defeating U.S. and coalition forces militarily today than they were eight years ago.  The 
reasons for the support they receive must be understood and countered with an effective 
long term coordinated information strategy.  The Taliban offer nothing more than a return 
to the way they ran Afghanistan before they were toppled and therefore nothing to 
improve the lives of the Afghan people.  They have a successful short term strategy based 
on fear, ignorance and a lack of an effective U.S. counter-narrative.  Although it will not 
be easy or quick, the U.S. and Afghan governments must jointly develop and execute an 
information strategy highlighting the benefits of the future and addressing the perceptions 
of all the Afghan people. 
The Taliban have demonstrated their willingness to adopt new technological tools 
for disseminating their messages when they have proven their effectiveness.    By 
embracing new messaging tools the Taliban are able to show the people they are a group 
willing to change.  They may have succeeded in convincing the people that they are a 
group that can change.  This is important because the people already have a perception 
and understanding of what life under Taliban rule is like and any way the Taliban can 
alter that perception works in their favor.   
The key themes the Taliban focus on contribute to their inability to garner more 
favorable support.  Their current disadvantage is that they concentrate on the same 
themes that brought them to power the first time.  The situation has altered and unless the 
Taliban can demonstrate that they have changed from the first time they held power, it is 
unlikely they will gather the necessary support to return to power.  The Afghan people’s 
desire to have peace and security, or a government guided by Islamic teaching and free of 
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corruption, which the Taliban capitalized on in their rise to power,  has not changed.   
What has changed is the people have experience with what Taliban rule means.   
Changing the delivery mechanisms for conveying their themes, clearly 
demonstrate that the Taliban have not fully grasped the understanding that they need to 
change the cultural framing of their themes.  By relying on the same cultural frames, the 
Taliban do not appear to have internalized why the population turned on them so quickly 
when U.S. forces went into Afghanistan and why even after eight years of war they are 
still willing to give the Karzai government a chance to work.  
The Taliban appear to have a information strategy based on short term obectives.  
Those objectives appear to be; hold out long enough until the U.S. forces leave, continue 
to highlight the fact that the current government is weak and corrupt, and sow fear by 
emphasizing that their presence will continue even after U.S. forces leave.  If the Taliban 
took a longer view, they would change the way they present themselves and their efforts.  
Currently they present themeselves iin a manner which suggests that they have more 
staying power than the U.S. and therefore the people will have to deal with them sooner 
or later, rather than offering a plan for how they could makes the peoples lives better.  
This does not endear them to the population, which is why they have been unable to 
generate much support. 
Returning to SMT and cultural framing literature, McAdams poinst out that 
“Framing contests occur in face-to-face interaction and through a variety of media - 
newspapers, books, pamphlets, radio, television.  Movement activists … have to change 
and mobilize bystander publics, many of whom may only know of the movement and its 
issues as portrayed in various media.”57  With this in mind, the Taliban information 
strategy has been unable or unwilling to change the people’s perceptions of them.  While 
the Taliban have been effectively denied radio and television outlets to disseminate their 
message, their most effective tool, the night letter, has mostly done nothing more than 
produce fear of the Taliban rather than generate long lasting support.  Even the 
acceptance of new technologies, such as web postings and videos on DVD appear to only 
                                                 
57 McAdam et al., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, 
Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, 270. 
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be effective in drawing in recruits already sympathetic to their ideology and boosting oral 
among its members.  There is little to no evidence that the Taliban information strategy is 
causing people to support their ideology. They may be contributing to the growing 
dissatisfaction the people are showing towards their current government and the presence 
of U.S. forces but that dissatisfaction does not appear to be translate into acceptance of a 
return to power of the Taliban. 
 57
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